On November 27, a coalition of armed opposition teams, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) started an offensive towards government-held positions in Aleppo and Idlib provinces within the northwest of Syria. Lower than two weeks later, they rolled into Damascus as President Bashar al-Assad and his household flew out in an unknown path.
The disintegration of the Syrian regime’s military was spectacularly fast. It brings to thoughts related collapses in Afghanistan – when the Taliban captured Kabul from the Afghan authorities following the withdrawal of the US power – and in Iraq, when ISIL (ISIS) invaded in 2014 and took Mosul, the second-largest Iraqi metropolis, inside days.
The successes of HTS, the Taliban and ISIL (ISIS) had been due as a lot to their mobilisation and inside cohesion – or “asabiyya” as Arab historian Ibn Khaldun would name it – as to their opponents’ failures. Networks of patronage and corruption dominated Syria’s military similar to they did Iraq’s and Afghanistan’s, making it unstable and ineffective with out help from international forces.
That, along with al-Assad’s faltering governance, lack of legitimacy and regime unpopularity ensured the Syrian army’s incapacity to face up to the advance of well-organised armed teams.
Patronage and low morale
For years, the Syrian opposition suffered from fragmentation and infighting, shedding floor to the Syrian regime. After 2020, the battle was largely thought of “frozen”, which allowed the opposition, particularly HTS, to consolidate and regroup. Regardless of a few years of setbacks, it didn’t lose the hope and the drive to struggle the Syrian regime.
This ensured a way of inside solidarity, which Ibn Khaldun recognized again within the 14th century as the important thing ingredient that made a tribal power robust sufficient to tackle complete kingdoms. He made this conclusion whereas observing the advance of Mongol chief Timur, who captured not simply huge swaths of land in Central Asia, but in addition components of India, Persia, Iraq, and Anatolia.
In 1400, his forces sacked Aleppo after which launched a lightning offensive, taking Hama and Homs. Ultimately, Damascus capitulated to Timur with out a battle in December 1400, with the unpopular Mamluk Sultan fleeing town in shock.
Within the case of the Syrian opposition, their morale was boosted not solely by inside solidarity, but in addition by the concept they’re combating for nationwide liberation.
Against this, the Syrian army was affected by low morale. Its ranks had been largely conscripts, a few of whom had been compelled into service after arrest and torture.
The 130,000-strong Syrian troops thus stood little likelihood towards the 30,00 insurgent fighters who superior. The military disintegrated similar to the 300,000-strong Afghan military did when it confronted a Taliban power of 60,000 fighters and similar to the 30,000-strong Iraqi power did when 1,500 ISIL (ISIS) fighters attacked Mosul.
In actuality, giant numbers disguise structural deficiencies. The Syrian military – just like the Iraqi and Afghan ones – was mired in corruption and had a major downside with “ghost troopers”. This phenomenon refers to rosters inflated by fictitious names in order that officers acquire extra paychecks.
This observe emerged as a result of the army served as a patronage community the place officer posts had been awarded based mostly on loyalty fairly than army acumen. These officers would then use their positions to extract wealth for themselves, both by way of these inflated rosters or the racketeering of the civilian inhabitants.
The autumn of a corrupt dynasty
When Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, then Syrian President Hafez al-Assad – Bashar’s father – gave up on Arab army alliances and unilaterally developed an enormous army power.
The Soviet Union equipped it with a fleet of tanks, artillery, and plane, in addition to ballistic Scud missiles to discourage what it perceived as its predominant enemy within the area – Israel. Syria additionally developed a chemical weapons programme to match the Israeli nuclear one.
Nevertheless, these weapons had been by no means utilized in a traditional struggle towards the Israeli army. This huge army energy was as a substitute unleashed towards Syria’s inhabitants – first below Hafez’s rule throughout the Hama rebellion after which below Bashar’s rule throughout the Syrian revolution in 2011.
Weapons designed to inflict critical injury on the Israeli army had been turned towards Syrian civilians. Al-Assad even launched his long-range ballistic Scud missiles on Syrian cities.
When the bloodbath of Syrian individuals by the army induced an enormous desertion drive which value it half of its officers and troopers, the al-Assad regime sought to import international forces to struggle on its behalf.
Lebanese fighters from Hezbollah and Russian fighters from the mercenary Wagner Group had been joined by varied pro-Iran armed teams and finally some common Russian forces.
Whereas these international forces managed to push again insurgent forces and safe the al-Assad regime, the latter made the deadly mistake of believing it may reign endlessly by brute power. It did near nothing to attempt to regain legitimacy by providing good governance to its individuals. It offered few providers and virtually no safety, because the Syrian economic system continued its freefall and requirements of residing plummeted.
This negligence was additionally mirrored in how the regime handled military ranks. As of 2023, troopers had been receiving bonuses of 10,000 Syrian lira or $0.75. Three days earlier than his fall, al-Assad made a last-ditch effort to spice up morale by elevating salaries within the army by 50 %. However this proved to haven’t any impact in anyway.
What remained of the Syrian army after it waged a decade-long struggle towards its personal individuals not appeared keen to wage one other decade-long struggle in 2024. With international forces not round to struggle on al-Assad’s behalf, Syrian troops withdrew from metropolis after metropolis till rebels took over Damascus. The military disappeared into skinny air as its troopers threw out their army uniforms in dustbins and placed on civilian garments.
As Ibn Khaldun noticed some 700 years in the past, corruption can kill asabiyya and produce the hasty downfall of complete dynasties. Clearly the al-Assads had not realized a lot from the historical past of their very own nation.
The views expressed on this article are the creator’s personal and don’t essentially replicate Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.
