New proof reveals that China has modernized and expanded a number of sign interception stations in Cuba.
The shut collaboration between Cuba and the Individuals’s Republic of China in intelligence issues has reignited safety alarms in Washington. In 2023, U.S. officers publicly confirmed that Beijing was leveraging espionage services on the Caribbean island, lower than 100 miles from Florida.
Cuba, as soon as host to the huge Soviet Lourdes intelligence heart in the course of the Chilly Battle, has turn into a sophisticated listening publish for China.
New proof — together with high-resolution satellite tv for pc imagery — exhibits that China has modernized and expanded a number of alerts intelligence (SIGINT) stations in Cuba, positioning them to observe delicate U.S. army communications in its personal yard. This international penetration presents a direct and unprecedented strategic problem not seen because the Missile Disaster.
Classification of Chinese language espionage websites in Cuba.
Based mostly on open-source intelligence (OSINT), categorized intelligence experiences, and evaluation from facilities comparable to CSIS, there’s confirmed or extremely probably presence of no less than eight websites of curiosity used or ready for alerts intelligence (SIGINT) by China or with help from the Individuals’s Liberation Military (PLA). Under are the websites categorized in line with the extent of verification:
Word: These classifications are primarily based on CSIS documentation (2024), Division of Protection experiences, and public satellite tv for pc observations.
Recruitment mechanisms: silent infiltration.
China has for many years deployed refined recruitment methods to put brokers throughout the U.S. authorities and army. Instances comparable to Glenn Duffie Shriver, recruited whereas learning in China to use to the CIA; or former army intelligence officer Ron Hansen, sentenced in 2019 for making an attempt to move categorized info to the Chinese language authorities, reveal a long-term, systemic technique.
The story additionally contains Larry Wu-Tai Chin, a CIA analyst recruited by China within the Nineteen Fifties who transmitted secrets and techniques for almost 30 years. Extra not too long ago, the case of Ambassador Víctor Manuel Rocha, infiltrated for many years by Cuban intelligence, raises severe questions on Sino-Cuban collaboration capabilities in HUMINT (human intelligence).
Inner and exterior surveillance from Cuba.
The Cuban regime ensures its inner survival, shielded by Chinese language expertise that permits it to anticipate dissent, monitor the inhabitants, and suppress protests earlier than they escalate.
China secures a sophisticated technical espionage node in opposition to the U.S., with out deploying seen army infrastructure, and with privileged entry to communications, satellites, and bases within the southern U.S.
China’s presence in Cuba needs to be understood as a part of a strategic negotiation: Beijing protects the Cuban regime from inside by means of expertise, surveillance, and repression in change for operational freedom to spy from the island. This dual-purpose makes Cuba the closest instance of the «Twenty first-century authoritarian alliance.»
Technological platforms utilized by the PRC and PLA.
The services in Bejucal, Calabazar, and El Salao present the usage of CDAAs (circularly disposed antenna arrays) and parabolic antenna methods for sign interception. Bejucal, particularly, was expanded with a brand new CDAA in 2024.
These platforms permit high-frequency sign triangulation, missile launch monitoring, and monitoring of radar networks and army communications.
Corporations like Huawei and ZTE have been concerned in Cuba’s telecommunications infrastructure, elevating credible suspicions that these civilian platforms may allow interception or cyber-intelligence actions.
Chinese language telecommunications infrastructure in Cuba (Huawei, ZTE, and others).
This checklist particulars the primary communications services linked to Chinese language firms (Huawei, ZTE, CEIEC) in Cuba, with potential functions in digital intelligence, strategic surveillance, and C4ISR help.
Word: Sources embody CSIS, leaked technical experiences, ETECSA bidding contracts, and OSINT evaluation of networks and BTS towers. Most of those belongings are straight or not directly related to community infrastructure managed by Chinese language entities.
Chinese language surveillance cameras in Cuba.
Technical commentary: These cameras are related to Huawei telecommunications networks, permitting centralized management from command facilities linked to the Ministry of the Inside (MININT).
Whereas formally justified as “public security” instruments, their real-time facial and behavioral evaluation capabilities elevate issues over their dual-use as civil surveillance infrastructure and C4ISR help belongings below international oversight.
Their proximity to strategic nodes (comparable to Bejucal, Calabazar, or the U.S. Embassy) makes them potential real-time visible intelligence platforms, complementing the Chinese language SIGINT capabilities already recognized on Cuban territory.
Coverage suggestions for the U.S.
- Strengthen army and diplomatic cryptography, together with satellite tv for pc communications and demanding knowledge hyperlinks.
- Deploy technical and cyber counterintelligence platforms to intrude with or deceive Chinese language SIGINT methods in Cuba.
- Interact in lively diplomacy with Caribbean and Hispanic america nations to stop the growth of Chinese language bases or related collaborations.
- Broaden FBI and Division of Protection counterintelligence packages, together with inner consciousness campaigns.
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